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ABSTRACT 
 Context-aware systems sense the state of their environment and adapt their behavior 
accordingly. Implementing context awareness in mission-critical systems can potentially 
mitigate hazards that arise in legacy systems. This thesis presents a systematic approach to 
apply safety analysis to identify opportunities for mitigating safety risk through mapping 
context-awareness capabilities to identified safety hazards. 
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The demand signal is growing for intelligent systems within the U. S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) in response to the ongoing great-power competition. The People’s 
Republic of China and the Russian Federation are investing in advanced technologies, 
including pushing the frontiers of the triad of artificial intelligence (AI), machine 
learning (ML), and data science (DS), in addition to operationalizing the triad in combat 
and related defense systems.  
However, nothing comes for free. All three parts of the triad introduce 
complexity into systems. For instance, a deep-learning neural network (NN) can do well 
at performing classification-based learning for certain types of tasks performed by 
drones, but it is difficult for a human to determine the set of rules the NN uses to classify 
data items. In recognition of this and related challenges associated with machine-based 
classification and reinforcement learning, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) established the Explainable AI (XAI) program, with the aim of 
enabling warfighters “to understand, appropriately trust, and effectively manage an 
emerging generation of artificially intelligent machine partners” [1]. 
Within the U.S. Navy, artificially intelligent machine partners are being 
incorporated into systems that control and release energy, particularly combat and 
weapons systems. If that energy is released in an unsafe manner, injury, death, property 
damage, or environmental damage may result. Ensuring system safety is an important 
ingredient that goes into being able to trust in the dependability of an artificially 
intelligent machine partner. However, how will the U.S. Navy evaluate the system safety 
afforded for instance by a warship that has Sailors partnering with one or more 
artificially intelligent machines such as weapons systems and the ship’s integrated 
bridge system? Introduction of AI and ML into the naval fleet poses safety-related risk 
that must be evaluated and considered in light of mission-readiness and mission-
effectiveness requirements. 
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B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis explores the safety aspects of operationalizing AI in naval shipboard 
systems. In particular this thesis identifies how modern system safety engineering can 
be used to analyze systems controlling energy that are expected to partner with the Sailor 
by perceiving at some level his or her environment, situation, and context. 
To break ground in this uncharted area of research, this thesis consists of a case 
study of a real shipboard system that relies on human-machine partnering. The case 
study consists of applying a modern accident analysis model on an actual accident that 
occurred at sea that at the core seemed to be a result of system-complexity challenges. 
Based on the findings from the model and analysis, the thesis introduces a notional 
system that has a layer of context awareness to address the safety deficiencies identified 
in the real system. The thesis concludes with a discussion of challenges and avenues for 
using contextual AI while ensuring that the overall system provides an acceptable level 
of safety. 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
Key findings from this research is as follows: 
1. A framed systematic approach to safety engineering: The approach uses 
Nancy Leveson’s methodology to characterize where the hazards exist 
within the hierarchical control structure of a system. Then one 
determines where in the system it would be applicable to use context 
awareness to mitigate the risk associated with the identified hazards. 
2. A case study of applying the approach to a real-world system that 
experienced a mishap revealed that utilizing the STAMP method can be 
beneficial to the DOD. 
D. CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis introduces a methodology for identifying which safety-critical or 
safety-related functions involving human-machine teaming could benefit from 
improvement in the context awareness of the human and/or machine portion of human-
3 
machine teaming. The Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) and other 
DOD organizations may be able to further develop and leverage the methodology 
introduced in this thesis to improve their safety engineering processes and practices. 
  
4 
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II. APPROACH 
A. THE SYSTEMS-THEORETIC ACCIDENT MODEL AND PROCESSES 
Safety has not always been a key consideration when developing systems. Even 
today when systems are more complex than they have ever been, safety can still be 
somewhat of an afterthought. However, the concept of safety has been taken more seriously 
over the years: This can possibly be attributed to the fact that there are means available to 
ensure a higher level of safety. In the past, the limitations in technology and lack of 
advanced techniques may have resulted in dangerous jobs and tasks having to be performed 
by humans and the probability of an accident occurring would have most likely been 
higher. What if even after taking safety more seriously and including it in the overall 
calculus of system operations the end product is still an unsafe operation which could result 
in an accident?  
This is the modern-day predicament we currently find ourselves in. The last 40 
years have seen the most serious accidents of the century. In fact, when considering death 
toll and injuries, the worst accident so far in modern history occurred in 1984 with the 
release of a toxic chemical at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India [2]. That is just one 
example of an accident facilitated by unsafe technology. The Therac-25, Chernobyl, Three 
Mile Island, and Challenger accidents were all serious, leaving indelible marks in the 
history books. This forces us to ask the hard question, does advancing technology introduce 
less safe systems? In 1995, Nancy Leveson asked the same question in her book Safeware: 
System Safety and Computers. That question was relevant in 1995 and is still relevant in 
2020, as presented in the Chapter III case study. 
When thinking about safety, it is a measure of risk which is defined as the 
possibility of loss or injury. In the context of this paper, the term loss can be thought of as 
an accident, which is “an unplanned and undesired loss event. That loss may involve human 
death and injury, but it may also involve other losses, including mission, equipment, 
financial, and information losses” [3]. Humans have understood the concept of risk from 
the beginning of time. However, the societal and environmental changes have reshaped the 
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way we think about and address risk [2]. During pre-industrialization people were 
concerned about natural risks, specifically inclement weather and all the second- and third-
order effects associated with it [2]. Post-industrialization has changed the risk from not 
only natural risks, but to man-made risks. Over time the risk associated from naturally 
occurring events has significantly decreased in developed countries, but the same 
development that decreased that risk is now itself a source of risk. In fact, this new risk has 
a much larger impact on the population. “In the United States, technological hazards 
account for 15 - 25 percent of human mortality and have significantly surpassed natural 
hazards in impact, cost, and general importance” [2]. 
In the Department of Defense, risk is typically thought of in an operational context. 
Given some mission or task, what is the operational risk? Each of the services will have a 
unique way of measuring that risk, but in general operational risk management is standard 
across the services. As an example, the U.S. Navy follows a systematic, continuous, and 
repeatable five-step process in accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
Instructions (OPNAVINST) 3500.39C Operational Risk Management [4]. Once the 
operational risk management cycle has been applied, a final risk assessment code will be 
assigned to the overall mission and the commander will be able to make a well-informed 
decision on whether to proceed with the mission or operation. This was just one Service’s 
way of evaluating operational risk, but it demonstrates that the Department of Defense is 
no stranger to risk evaluation. Systems our Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and Airmen rely on 
everyday also need to be evaluated for risk and overall safety. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance define system safety as “the application of engineering and 
management principles, criteria and techniques to optimize safety within the constraints of 
operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle” [5]. 
One of the most challenging tasks is to find the happy medium between operational 
effectiveness and safety. In many engineering disciplines as well as other fields, safety and 
operational effectiveness are thought to be synonymous [3]. This assumption is wrong and 
the distinction between the two must be recognized [3]. An unsafe system can be reliable, 
and a safe system can be unreliable [3]. This is just one of seven assumptions Nancy 
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Leveson challenges. Assumptions such as the one posited by NASA possibly stem from a 
time when system complexity was less of a factor in the design and operation of systems. 
Modern-day systems are increasingly complex and how we view their properties is a 
critical factor in analyzing system safety.  
Legacy accident analysis models utilized to understand why and how accidents 
occur have largely been based on failure events [3]. The complex systems humans interact 
with everyday require a different approach. Thinking of safety as a control problem instead 
of a reliability problem can make for a more robust and effective way to evaluate and create 
safer systems [3]. It is no longer appropriate to think of an accident as simply a series of 
failure events [3]. Failure events are now just additional pieces of the puzzle. Component 
interactions and systemic causal mechanisms must also now be included in the analysis 
[3]. “Losses result from component failures, disturbances external to the system, 
interactions among system components, and behavior of individual system components 
that lead to hazardous system states” [3]. We hope to achieve a better understanding of 
why accidents happen in the first place, and with that understanding, we can get closer to 
designing and implementing the necessary controls that will make today’s complex 
systems safer [3]. 
Nancy Leveson introduces us to a new causality model: Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). STAMP emphasizes enforcing behavioral 
constraints vice failure prevention [3]. There are three tenets to the STAMP model: (1) 
safety constraints, (2) hierarchical safety control structures, and (3) process models [3]. 
1. Safety Constraints. If or when an accident occurs it is a failure of the 
safety constraints that the system has in place [3]. During the design 
process, developers and engineers need to be cognizant of the second- and 
third-order effects that safety constraints create. A system failure may 
occur farther down the process due to the implementation of some safety 
constraint. There should be a tiered approach— the overall goal per se. For 
example, the system safety requirement is lube oil must maintain a 
specific temperature for optimum main propulsion diesel engine 
performance [3]. The next question safety engineers should be asking is, 
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“Ok, how do we maintain lube oil temperature?” The answer to this 
question will be in the next tier of safety constraints. Every sub action 
taken needs to be understood and the second- and third-order effects from 
those actions need to be accounted for. The more complex systems 
become the more component interactions that need to be taken into 
account in safety analyses. The increase in component interactions will 
undoubtedly increase the likelihood that hazards will arise, and the 
presence of those hazards can significantly increase the likelihood of an 
accident—possibly severe—occurring.  
2. Hierarchical Safety Control Structures. The logic stems from systems 
theory, the idea that individual levels place constraints on the function of 
the level below it [3]. Clear communication between the layers is critical. 
The downward flow is referred to as the reference channel. It provides 
instructions to ensure safety constraints are in place [3]. The upward 
direction is referred to the measuring channel, and this enables a safety 
constraint feedback mechanism in the system [3]. Figure 1 demonstrates 
the upward/downward flow of communication. 
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Figure 1. General model of sociotechnical control. Source: [3]. 
3. Process Models. Process models are part of control theory. There are four 
elements needed to control a process: a goal, an action condition, an 
observability condition, and a model condition. 
The first is a goal, which in STAMP is the safety constraints that must 
be enforced by each controller in the hierarchical safety control 
structure. The action condition is implemented in the (downward) 
control channels and the observability condition is embodied in the 
(upward) feedback or measuring channels. The final condition is the 
model condition: Any controller—human or automated—needs a model 
of the process being controlled to control it effectively. [3]  
Where the model exists does not matter, but the information a model contains must all be 
the same [3]. Figure 2 shows the elements of the model: control laws, current state, and 
state transitions and provides an excellent visual. When a process does not adhere to the 
process model used by the controller (human or automated) an accident can occur [3].  
10 
 
Figure 2. Controller utilizing a process model. Source: [3]. 
Utilizing STAMP, accidents can be better understood. STAMP provides for 
considering additional causes beyond vague causal explanations [3]. This is accomplished 
by working through the three steps just discussed: safety constraint identification, 
hierarchical control structure evaluation, and process model evaluation.  
B. CAUSAL ANALYSIS BASED ON STAMP 
STAMP is the accident causality model. The causal analysis based on STAMP 
(CAST) is the technique utilized to conduct the analysis of an accident that has already 
occurred. “In STAMP, an accident is regarded as involving a complex process, not just 
individual events. Accident analysis in CAST then entails understanding the dynamic 
process that led to the loss” [3]. CAST is a series of steps but one thing to be clear on is the 
order the steps are listed does not lock us into that order of execution [3]. The steps listed 
by [3] are as follows: 
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the loss. 
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements 
associated with that hazard. 
3. Document the safety control structure in place to control the hazard 
and enforce the safety constraints. 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the loss. 
5. Analyze the loss at the physical system level. 
6. Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how 
and why each successive higher level allowed or contributed to the 
inadequate control at the current level. 
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7. Examine overall coordination and communication contributors to 
the loss. 
8. Determine the dynamics and the changes in the system and the 
safety control structure relating to the loss and any weakening of the 
safety control structure over time. 
9. Generate recommendations. [3] 
In the following chapter, CAST will be applied to an accident that took place in 
2017 involving a collision at sea between a commercial tanker and a U.S. Navy Destroyer. 
That accident resulted in death, injury, and financial loss. The U.S. Navy should be a leader 
in operating safely in the maritime domain. The increased complexity in the maritime 
domain and the increased complexity in the sociotechnical environment that our sailors 
find themselves in everyday poses challenges to realizing that leadership role. 
C. A NEW METHODOLOGY BASED ON STAMP 
In this thesis, STAMP serves as the core of a new methodology introduced to 
identify safety hazards and hazard causal factors for which the risk associated with them 
can be mitigated via improving or introducing the context awareness of human-machine 
teaming. Figure 3 provides a visual depiction of the ideal workflow to implement context-
awareness via STAMP. Of note, at each stage of the process there is a feedback loop to 
ensure a mechanism exists that allows previous work to be adjusted based on findings 
farther down in the process. The methodology can be the framework for future work done 
in this sector. This workflow can aide in increasing the safety of systems that implement 
complex technology. This can ultimately ensure systems that utilize human-machine 
teaming are safe and resilient during operations. 
12 
 
Figure 3. Methodology for extending STAMP for identifying safety hazards 
and hazard causal factors in human-machine teaming. 
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III. CASE STUDY 
A. BACKGROUND 
USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) (JSM), a Flight I DDG stationed in Yokosuka, 
Japan was on a six-month deployment in the SEVENTHFLT AOR during the summer of 
2017. During that deployment JSM successfully completed operations in the East and 
South China seas as well as several port visits to countries in the region. JSM was enroute 
to Changi Naval Base, Singapore on 21 August 2017. The transit through the Singapore 
Strait commenced in the evening with overcast skies, a calm sea, and a fully operational 
navigation and engineering line up.  
The Commanding Officer (CO) was present on the bridge since 0115, the Executive 
Officer (XO) since 0430, and the Sea and Anchor detail was to be set at 0600. The JSM 
entered the Singapore Strait around 0520 and almost immediately was posed with 
challenges due to the steering system. Through a series of events that will be discussed in 
much greater detail later on, the JSM seemingly had no control of its steering and at 0524 
the JSM collided with MV ALNIC MC, a Liberian-flagged chemical tanker. Ten U.S. Navy 
Sailors lost their lives, 48 were injured, and the JSM sustained over $100 million in damage 
[6]. The full U.S. Navy report on the collision between JSM and MV ALNIC MC is in the 
appendix. 
The hazard being controlled is at-sea collision. This hazard is on the back of every 
sailor’s and CO’s mind. An incident at sea is the fastest way to tarnish a professional 
reputation and, in most cases, results in being relieved of command. There exists a well-
documented control structure to prevent collisions at sea. There also were traditional safety 
constraints in the system. However, the new technology introduced on the bridge 
introduced challenges and created gaps that allowed unsafe system behavior to exist. Both 
a U.S. Navy and National Transportation Safety Board conducted accident investigations 
and published their findings. 
In this case study we demonstrate the feasibility of using STAMP for modeling and 
analyzing the accident, in addition to the added insight that STAMP provides to the user 
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for understanding the systemic causes in the breakdown of the safety controls in the system 
control hierarchy. The source of information about the accident was the official U.S. Navy 
investigation report [7], the National Transportation Safety Board investigation report [6], 
and the Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents [8]. 
Safety professionals and researchers that have first-hand experience with STAMP 
have found that just using the existing accident reports can produce very different views of 
the causality of an accident [3]. There are many more documents that could assist in the 
accident analysis. Technical documentation on the steering system and local operating 
procedures associated with each steering console would provide a deeper understanding of 
the incident but were not available for this case study. Traditional accident analysis tends 
to focus on blame, but STAMP is more about why the events occurred in the first place. 
By no means discrediting the importance of determining liability in accidents, but why did 
this occur and how can we improve processes is the real answers STAMP seeks. Liability 
can also be narrowed down on using a systems-theoretic approach so it can be helpful in 
many ways when conducting accident analysis. 
B. DETERMINE THE PROXIMATE EVENTS LEADING TO THE LOSS 
Breaking down the chain of events in an accident is important to understand the 
process model, but not necessarily the end all be all when looking to determine causality 
[3]. In this case study, the following chain of events will only take us to the point of the 
collision. There is a major damage control effort that takes place after the collision.  
The events leading to the collision between JSM and MV ALNIC MC are (all times 
are local) [6], [7]: 
20 August 2017 
1.  The JSM conducted the navigation brief for the following day’s transit to 
Sembawang, Singapore. Based on the time, speed, and distance calculations 
the JSM would enter the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme at 
approximately 0500 on 21 August 2017. The CO set sea and anchor detail at 
0600 on 21 August 2017 in order to ensure optimal crew rest. 
15 
21 August 2017 
2. At 0115, the CO reported to the bridge in preparation for the high contact 
density environment. 
3.  At 0436, the CO ordered the steering mode to be shifted from computer-
assisted manual to back-up manual mode. 
4. At 0519, the CO directed the split between steering and thrust control. 
5. At 0520, the JSM enters the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme. 
6. At 0521, the Helmsman reports a loss of steering. 
7.  At 0522, the CO via the Officer of the Deck ordered a reduction in speed from 
20kts to 10kts. The Lee Helm only had control of the port shaft, and 
subsequently only reduced the speed of the port shaft. 
8. At 0523, Aft-Steering was manned and manually took control of steering by 
pressing the emergency override to manual button on the Alternate Steering 
Control Unit. 
9.  Right as steering was shifted to Aft-Steering (0523), the Helmsmen on the 
bridge pressed the emergency override button which now returned steering 
control to the Helmsman position on the bridge. 
10.  At 05:23:17, the CO ordered right standard rudder. This is a 15-degree turn. 
11. As the CO ordered the rudder command, the steering control had been 
transferred again to Aft-Steering. 
12.  At 05:23:28, Aft-Steering had steering control in computer-assisted manual 
mode. 
13.  At 05:23:43, the rudder is now right 15 degrees. 
14.  At 05:23:58, the M/V ALNIC MC impacted the JSM. 
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C. DEFINING THE SYSTEM(S) AND HAZARDS INVOLVED IN THE LOSS 
There were two main physical processes at play in this incident at sea. One physical 
process is the operation of a U.S. Navy destroyer, and the other being the operation of a 
civilian merchant vessel. As mentioned previously, the focus of this case study will be the 
processes that failed on the JSM. The M/V ALNIC MC’s inaction was a contributing factor 
in the collision. Her design space is out of the control of U.S. Navy engineers and therefore 
the safety control structure will not be detailed in this case study. Figure 4 is a notional 
safety control structure for JSM. 
 
Figure 4. Notional safety control structure for JSM. Adapted from [9]. 
When operating a U.S. Naval warship at sea, one of the most dangerous hazards is 
collision at sea. The system-level safety constraints in place to mitigate a collision at sea 
are: 
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• Sail in accordance with the Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) [10] 
• All members trained in their respective watch positions 
• Comply and enforce the Commanding Officers Standing Orders 
D. DOCUMENTING THE SAFETY CONTROL STRUCTURE 
Now that the system level constraints have been identified, expanding on them 
provides the specific safety constraints that need to be in place to prevent accidents. Sailing 
in accordance with COLREGS is pretty straight forward: A vessel either does or does not. 
The bridge watch team must be well versed in the rules. COLREGS allows all mariners to 
be on the same page. They provide procedures on how to interact at sea. It does not matter 
whether it is a military vessel or a civilian vessel. COLREGS must be adhered to. 
Each watch position has very specific roles. Referring back to Figure 3, each of 
those positions carry different qualification standards. For example, the Officer of the 
Deck, who is in charge of running the bridge watch team will have had to complete several 
personnel qualification standards and also successfully pass an oral board with the CO. 
Once deemed a qualified Officer of the Deck, that sailor has the trust and confidence of the 
CO to safely and professionally sail the vessel at sea. The other bridge team positions do 
not have that same level of requirements, but that is just because they have fewer 
responsibilities. Each member of the bridge team will be qualified in their specific role. 
The Helmsman will have completed the personal qualification standard for the Helmsman 
position and so on. 
Every U.S. Naval warship’s CO promulgates Standing Orders. These orders cover 
just about every standard scenario a U.S. Naval warship will find themselves in. The 
Standing Orders cover topics such as how close to other vessels you can be before a voice 
report to the CO is required, or how to position the ship when preparing for flight 
operations. Every CO has their own set of Standing Orders and hence they will all vary 
from ship to ship and CO to CO. It is the responsibility of the bridge watch team to be 
intimately familiar with them. 
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E. ANALYZING THE PHYSICAL PROCESS 
The proximal event chain that leads up to the accident is a great way to hone in on 
the key actions that contributed to the overall result. The CO had decided to set the sea and 
anchor detail after the ship would already be in the traffic separation scheme (TSS). The 
sea and anchor detail is a beefed-up watch team. There are additional watch team members 
and the personnel assigned are typically the more seasoned watch standers. The times you 
would set a sea and anchor detail are when the vessel is conducting more complex 
operations (e.g., pull in/out of port, sailing through high traffic density areas). Planning to 
man the sea and anchor watchbill mitigated some of the risk associated with traveling 
through the TSS. That safety constraint failed when the CO determined that he would man 
the sea and anchor an hour after the JSM entered the TSS. 
Prior to entering the TSS, the CO ordered the Helmsman to shift the Steering 
Control Console (SCC) from computer-assisted manual mode to backup manual mode. 
There are several modes that the SCC can operate in. The two modes used onboard JSM 
are computer-assisted manual mode and backup manual mode. The difference between 
these modes is how the SCC communicates with the rudder control box. In computer-
assisted manual mode, the SCC utilizes computers and software to communicate, where 
backup manual utilizes copper wire. Aside from the operating modes, there are five 
locations that a watchstander can drive the ship from. See Figure 5 for the layout of the 
JSM’s bridge. There are four stations on the bridge a watchstander can drive the ship from, 
and one station known as the Aft-Steering Unit (ASU). The ASU is only manned and 
utilized in an emergency.  
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Figure 5. USS John S. McCain bridge layout. Source: [6]. 
According to the Integrated Bridge and Navigation System (IBNS) technical 
manual, when in backup manual mode, any other station can unilaterally take control of 
steering. When in computer-assisted manual mode, the transferring of steering requires the 
relinquishing station to initiate and the gaining station to acknowledge. This represents a 
safety-constraint by not allowing any station to just take control of steering. However, by 
the CO ordering the SCC be shifted to backup manual mode, this safety-constraint is no 
longer in place and steering can be unilaterally taken by any of the five stations. 
The CO had good intentions by ordering the splitting of the responsibility of thrust 
and steering control. Up to this point, the Helmsman was also the Lee Helmsman. Steering 
and thrust control was all done by one person on one console. In Figure 6 the green shaded 
portion is the Helm station, and the blueish grey portion is the Lee Helm station. 
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Figure 6. USS John S. McCain SCC. Source: [6]. 
Once a sailor had assumed the Lee Helm position, the sailor began the thrust control 
transfer from the helm station to the lee helm station. Thrust control transfer is done in a 
similar fashion as steering control transfer. The one difference for thrust control transfer is 
that control of each shaft is done one at a time. The JSM is a dual-shaft ship. The 
relinquishing station (Helm Station) initiated the transfer of the port shaft, and the gaining 
station (Lee Helm Station) accepted the transfer. At this point, the Lee Helm has control of 
only the port shaft. Right before the Helmsman initiates the transfer of the starboard shaft, 
he determines he no longer has control of steering. In line with proper watch standing, the 
Helmsman announces that he has a loss of steering. 
Analysis of video logs that time stamp all transfers and configuration changes 
revealed that the steering was transferred to the Lee Helm station around the same time 
that the two stations (Helm and Lee Helm) were conducting the thrust transfer. Figure 7 




Figure 7. Image of a portion of the IBNS console onboard USS John S. 
McCain. Source: [6]. 
According to the Helmsman, the steering console will sound an alarm when there 
is a loss of steering at that station. The alarm notifying the Helmsman of a loss of steering 
is a safety constraint that can immediately bring the steering loss to the attention of the 
Helmsman. This is especially helpful if the Helmsman is operating in a more automated 
mode (i.e., less hands on), which may eliminate the typical haptic feedback one would get 
if steering control was lost. The video logs show no loss of steering and that it was actually 
transferred to the Lee Helm station; this raises some concern. Software defects can be 
challenging to find in complex systems, but the evidence presented in the accident reports 
makes a strong case for concluding that steering control transfer was done unbeknownst to 
the Helmsman. Since the SCC was in backup manual mode, the unilateral transfer of 
steering was possible.  
Once the Helmsman announced a loss of steering, the CO ordered a reduction in 
speed. The JSM had been travelling at 18kts, and the Officer of the Deck ordered the speed 
be reduced to 10kts. When the initial thrust transfer was conducted the process was 
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interrupted due to a perceived loss-of-steering event. During the commotion, the Lee 
Helmsman completed the transfer of the starboard shaft by himself. Prior to the port thrust 
transfer, when the Helmsman had control of both steering and thrust, the shafts were 
ganged. The term ganged refers to the control mechanism that is utilized to adjust shaft 
speed. When the shafts are ganged, any adjustment made to one shaft will also be made 
automatically on the other. Figure 8 shows what the IBNS thrust control screen looks like. 
 
Figure 8. IBNS thrust control GUI. Source: [6]. 
The Lee Helmsman acknowledged the speed change order, and adjusted the port 
shaft accordingly in order to achieve the 10kts. The Lee Helmsman had intended to adjust 
both shafts, but the shafts became un-ganged and the Lee Helmsman was unaware of this 
when he adjusted the speed. The Lee Helmsman told the NTSB investigator that he had re-
ganged the shafts after the transfer. Since only one shaft’s speed was adjusted, the ship 
started to drift to port. The slower speed on the port shaft and the faster speed on the 
starboard shaft essentially put JSM into a port-twist. When transferring thrust from one 
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station to another, the settings at the previous station should travel with the control. A safety 
constraint should have existed here, and the un-ganging of the shafts should not have 
happened. 
The Aft Steering Unit (ASU) now manned after the bridge watch team called away 
the loss of steering at the helm station on the bridge. When there is a loss of steering on the 
bridge, the secondary control point is the ASU. The CO ordered the ASU to take control 
of steering, and the ASU acknowledged the order and pressed the emergency-override-to-
manual button. See Figure 5 for reference. By pressing the emergency-override-to-manual 
button, that station will unilaterally take steering control and the mode of steering will shift 
to backup manual. The watchstander at the Helm Station believed that in order for the ASU 
to take control, he needed to hit the emergency-override-to-manual button at his station. A 
few moments go by, and the Helmsman on the bridge realizes he has positive steering 
control (i.e., physical control of steering has been regained). Positive steering control at the 
SCC is announced. The CO orders a “right 15 degrees rudder” and reducing the speed to 
5kts. The video logs show that both shafts were adjusted to achieve the 5kts. This also 
corrected the speed difference between shafts from before.  
When positive steering control was achieved on the bridge at the SCC, the ASU 
requested to take back control of steering and the Helmsman at the SCC granted the request 
and relinquished control of steering back to the ASU. The CO had ordered a 15-degree 
rudder angle to the right in order to avoid collision with the M/V ALNIC MC, but when 
the steering was shifted back to the ASU for the last time the rudders swung a minimum 
15-degrees to the left. The ASU dialed up the 15-degrees to the right rudder angle, but this 
control action was too late. The JSM and M/V ALNIC MC collided at 05:23:58. There was 
confusion amongst the watchstanders about how the IBNS functions as modes change and 
the locations of steering changed. System complexity overcame the watch team. This was 
a root cause for the collision. 
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F. ANALYZING THE HIGHER LEVELS OF THE SAFETY CONTROL 
STRUCTURE 
Referring back to Figure 3, the Bridge Team is the operational level of this process. 
The CO, XO, and Navigator make up the leadership triad from a seamanship and 
navigation perspective onboard the JSM. The ship has an operational chain of command 
and an administrative chain of command. Since the JSM was stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, 
she operationally falls under Commander, SEVENTH Fleet (C7F) who then reports to 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) in Honolulu, HI. COMPACFLT 
operationally reports to the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). 
COMPACFLT is USINDOPACOM’s Naval Component Commander and is responsible 
for providing USINDOPACOM ready naval assets. 
The administrative chain of command is similar to the operational but deviates at 
COMPACFLT and includes Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific 
(COMNAVSURFPAC). COMNAVSURFPAC is responsible for the manning, training, 
and equipping of the surface forces in the Pacific theater. Analyzing the higher levels of 
the safety control structure for this accident will mostly involve the administrative chain of 
command due to the manning, training, and equipping of JSM being identified as the root 
issues. 
The U.S. Navy’s answer on how to streamline processes on the bridge was to 
introduce automation implemented via software that can handle multiple legacy system 
functions. With shrinking budgets, the IBNS was supposed to make navigating the world’s 
oceans less complex and less manning-intensive. There was clear evidence of operator 
error onboard JSM, but a series of decisions made at the higher levels also contributed to 
the environment that allowed these errors to happen in the first place. A requirement existed 
to have an IBNS specialized technician onboard, but due to staffing shortages the higher-
levels waived the requirement [11]. Gaps in documentation of IBNS were discovered 
during the investigation period, notably JSM’s IBNS documentation onboard was said to 
be three years out of date [11].  
The higher levels in the safety control structure are critical in the U.S. Navy. As 
with most hierarchical structures, the lower levels depend on the higher levels to function 
25 
correctly. The Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents noted that, 
“There were decisions at headquarters that stemmed from a culturally engrained ‘can do’ 
attitude and an unrecognized accumulation of risk that resulted in the ships not being ready 
to safely operate at sea” [8]. While this case study does not go into the details of U.S. Navy 
culture, the point being made is saying “no” or “I don’t think we can handle that” is not 
part of the vocabulary. When given a task, a sailor (all levels) will do it to the best of their 
ability and will just find a way to get it done. This accident has put a spotlight on the surface 
forces, and while tragic due to the loss of life, a certain level of reflection appears to have 
taken place amongst the force. The Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force 
Incidents went into great detail of the history of the integrated bridge system concept and 
lays out a very respectable plan on how to approach the future of bridge modernization. A 
key comment made in the review which encompasses exactly how the U.S. Navy should 
integrate complex technology not only on the bridge of warships but through all safety-
critical systems. 
For safety critical controls interfaces, issues like these should be 
prevented through upfront analysis of human-machine-interface 
requirements and validated through qualification testing in advance of 
equipment delivery. If thorough human factors assessments, land-based 
testing, and design qualification are considered too expensive or time 
consuming, then modernization of these controls systems should not be 
undertaken [8]. 
G. COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
Communication failures can be found in almost all accidents. The bridge 
watchteam on board the JSM did not communicate effectively. From the documents 
available for analysis, the internal communication was mediocre at best, but it is the 
external communications that led to a higher-risk state. The CO ordered the navigation 
lights be adjusted to represent the ships current status as they combat the perceived loss 
steering casualty. This notifies mariners in the surrounding area that the vessel is unable to 
maneuver in accordance with the COLREGS. The investigation revealed the navigation 
lights were never adjusted prior to the collision. Additionally, the Bridge-to-Bridge (BTB) 
radio is used to communicate with vessels in the surrounding area. Under nominal 
operations the BTB is used to coordinate things from safe distance passing to notifications 
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of special operations the vessel may be conducting. The accident reports revealed that the 
officer of the deck (OOD) did not make contact with the M/V ALNIC MC. Had the Master 
onboard M/V ALNIC MC been more aware of the JSM’s challenges, the Master could 
have executed precautionary maneuvers to remain a safe distance from the JSM. 
H. DYNAMICS AND MIGRATION TO A HIGH-RISK STATE 
This has been discussed at length already, but the CO’s decision to operate IBNS 
in backup manual mode instantly put the ship in a high-risk state. The added protection 
designed into the other modes of operation were not ignored but not understood. The 
general consensus from reviewing the documents pertinent to the accident is that the 
unilateral transfers of steering and thrust in backup manual mode was unknown. 
Additionally, during the initial investigation, the CO made it very clear that he had little 
confidence in the IBNS. His decision to execute a thrust transfer to an alternate control 
station while in the Singapore Strait TSS added to the complexity of the current state. 
I. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
The use of STAMP to conduct this survey level accident analysis did not result in 
the uncovering of any previously undocumented findings. The use of STAMP does provide 
a very clear and concise process on how to approach the analysis of accidents involving 
complex systems. This analysis relied heavily on the three documents mentioned in the 
introduction, and each document seemed to be geared towards different audiences. By 
utilizing the STAMP method, all three documents can be captured in just one. That is not 
necessarily an undiscovered finding, but something to keep in mind.  
The recommendations from the reports are broad and leave room for the technical 
experts to interpret. Shortly after the collision, there have been “class advisories” published 
to bring key weaknesses of the system to the attention of units that have IBNS. The Navy 
has decided to stick with the IBNS system, but is in the process of re-introducing the 
physical throttles that control speed of each shaft [12]. The investigation found that IBNS 
was not to be compliant with ASTM International in Standard F1166, Standard Practice for 
Human Engineering Design for Marine Systems, Equipment, and Facilities. The 
implementation of a control mechanism that measures a discrete value vs. a continuous value 
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is the subject of non-compliance. It is noted that touch-screen controls are not appropriate for 
continuous control functions. The throttle control falls into this category. The non-compliance 
is probably driving the quick reaction by Naval engineers to re-introduce the physical throttles 
to the bridge.  
One recommendation that seems appropriate is a deeper look at safety constraints in 
place when operating in backup manual mode. The initial design scheme allows the unilateral 
transfer to any station which can be useful in the event there is a casualty and only one station 
is accessible. That scenario is still valid, and that functionality should remain, but there can be 
another layer that requires the user to acknowledge the unilateral request. This could be a 
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IV. CONTEXT AWARENESS IN SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS
A. WHAT IS CONTEXT AWARENESS?
Before understanding what a Context-Aware System is, we must define the terms
context and awareness. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of context is (1) “the parts 
of a discourse that surrounds a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning” [13], (2) 
“the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs” [13], and the definition of 
awareness is (1) “knowledge and understanding that something is happening or exists” [14]. 
The second definition of context is the one we care about. Now take the term context-aware; 
the knowledge and understanding of interrelated conditions that exists or occurs. As humans, 
this is a basic everyday function. During any given day, humans find themselves in many 
different situations that require a degree of awareness and some level of understanding the 
context of the situation. Many of these situations involve human-to-human interactions, and 
how a human navigates the situation can determine characteristics about him or her. This is 
more of a social approach to understanding context awareness. We are interested in 
understanding context-aware computing, and you will find that the underlying themes are the 
same. 
Thinking about our human example, how could systems behave in a similar manner? 
It is definitely a new way of thinking about computing. From the beginning of personal 
computing to modern day, a computer was considered a ‘dumb’ machine. A user (human) 
would instruct the machine to perform an operation and the machine would follow those 
instructions precisely. If the human instructions were erroneous or flawed in any way, the 
computer would fail at correctly performing the operation. The machine had no way to 
determine whether the input it receives from the human is correct or what the human intended 
for a particular context of performing work. Imagine the everyday convenience humans could 
experience if computers had the ability to understand and adapt to their environment and the 
user they are interacting with. “One hypothesis that a number of ubiquitous computing 
researchers share is that enabling devices and applications to automatically adapt to changes 
in their surrounding physical and electronic environments will lead to an enhancement of the 
user experience” [15]. 
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In 1994 M. Theimer and B. Schilit introduced this idea of context-aware computing 
[16]. They defined context-aware computing as “the ability of a mobile user’s applications to 
discover and react to changes in the environment they are situated in” [16]. Their definition is 
somewhat constraining: There is no reason that context-awareness should be limited to mobile 
applications. This idea of context-aware computing has been applied over a mired of 
applications; tourism, the retail market, transportation, event planning, and healthcare to name 
a few [16]. Figure 9 provides a visual aid of a basic context-aware system. 
 
Figure 9. Example of a basic context-aware computing system. 
Source: [17]. 
B. SHIP STEERING, NAVIGATION, AND COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY 
When one thinks about all the important or critical systems that make up a U.S. 
Naval warship, the first thoughts are typically about big guns or missile systems. Those 
thoughts are not wrong. The weapon systems onboard U.S. Naval warships are absolutely 
critical, but what about the system that maneuvers and guides the warship? The steering 
and navigation system is arguably just as critical as a weapon system. If you cannot sail 
the seas and confront your enemy, how will you ever deploy your weapon systems?  
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The fundamentals of steering a ship have been largely unchanged from the days of 
sail. The ship has one or more rudders and some way of moving the rudder in the desired 
direction so that the flow of water will be deflected, resulting in the stern moving away 
from the direction the rudder is pointing. Whether this be a steering oar, a rope and pulley 
system, steam generated mechanisms, or electro-hydraulic systems the result is typically 
the same [18]. The rudder moves in the direction it was commanded. As ships grew larger 
and became faster, the means of moving the rudder also changed. The torque required and 
the speed at which it moved needed to keep up with the demands of the vessel it was 
steering [18]. While the mechanical engineering behind these more modern steering 
systems is complex, the designs are tried and true. A probability of failure in the mechanical 
components of a modern steering system is very low. However, maintaining acceptable 
levels of reliability and safety continue to be challenging as the complexity of steering 
systems increase and increasing percentage of steering functionality is allocated to 
software. 
Despite its complexity, automation via software of the steering function frees the 
mariner to perform other important tasks. However, automation of safety-critical functions 
like steering does not always have the intended outcome, as evidenced by the mishap 
experienced by the USS John S. McCain. While the complexity of the new Integrated 
Bridge and Navigation System played a role, the human-computer interface seems to be 
the central safety issue. In reference to the retrofitting of the physical throttle controls, U.S. 
Navy sailors preferred the less complex configuration, and it was the overwhelming 
sentiment that the less complex the system the more reliable it was [19]. 
The Integrated Bridge and Navigation system is far more complex then legacy 
steering systems, but nowhere near as complex as a system incorporating technology such 
as artificial intelligence. In addition, military commanders are held accountable for their 
own actions and the actions of every individual under their command. In such a culture in 
which critical decisions can cost careers and in worst-case scenarios lives, how do we 
engineer such systems so that users will accept delegation of machine making critical 
decisions? That all being said, the Department of Defense knows the direction it must head. 
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) protects our nation by deterring 
war and winning the nation’s wars when deterrence fails. In fulfilling 
this mission, we have always been at the forefront of technological 
advances to ensure an enduring competitive military advantage against 
those who threaten our security and safety. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
is one such technological advance. AI refers to the ability of machines 
to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence - for example, 
recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, 
making predictions, or taking action - whether digitally or as the smart 
software behind autonomous physical systems [20]. 
Can the implementation of artificial intelligence in DOD safety-critical systems 
increase safety and reliability in a way that sailors will trust the machine to do all the right 
things when employed? The ethical challenges that artificial intelligence poses have little 
to no impact on a steering system. That makes this scenario slightly less complex when 
evaluating the sociotechnical aspects of incorporating this kind of technology. AI does 
make the system more technically complex, but does the sailor need to understand or be 
able to explain every aspect of the system and the decisions it makes? 
The scope of systems the DOD utilizes is quite broad, systems that make decisions 
on when ordnance should be fired will require a higher level of explainability than other 
systems that pose lesser risk of harm. There are a handful of flavors of AI, and fully 
autonomous, which most think of when AI is mentioned, is not always the answer. In DOD 
safety-critical systems it is almost never the answer. That is true now but as technology 
advances and a culture shift occurs that may become less true. 
Human-in-the-loop, human-out-of-the-loop, and human-on-the-loop are the flavors 
of AI systems that could be viable options for DOD safety-critical systems [21]. As 
mentioned above, human-out-of-the-loop is farther in the future, but human-in-the-loop AI 
implemented into a steering system could be a game changer. On the bridge of U.S. Navy 
warships every single watchstander is familiar with two concepts: Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) and watchteam back-up. BRM is a method of utilizing all of your 
available resources during operations. Operating in a vacuum is never the answer. 
Spreading the load during times of intense data flow is guaranteed to make any operation 
safer and more efficient [22]. Watchteam back-up is a similar concept but just a bit less 
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formal. Everybody on the bridge has set roles and responsibilities, but everybody should 
have a level of situational awareness that can assist the watchteam where necessary. 
The future steering and navigation systems could implement some form of context 
awareness that would act as an additional layer of watchteam backup or BRM. This concept 
being a human-in-the-loop system would not take away decision-making abilities, but 
rather serve as a decision-shaping tool. In addition to the other bridge watchstanders, this 
new system would process all relevant data being fed to it and output decision-shaping 
recommendations to aid the human watchstander in the execution of watch-standing duties. 
C. A HYPOTHETICAL CONTEXT AWARE LAYER IN THE INTEGRATED 
BRIDGE NAVIGATION SYSTEM  
There were two significant events that took place onboard JSM leading up to the 
collision that this new theoretical system could have aided in preventing: 
1. The unintended transfer of steering from the helm station to the lee helm 
station. 
2. The un-ganging of shafts during thrust transfer from the helm station to 
the lee helm station. 
A system being aware through the sensing of conditions, such as the environmental 
context and system state could aid in mapping to hazards. The human-machine partnering 
is paramount here. IBNS did not alert the Helmsman nor Lee Helmsman about the potential 
of their control actions to move the ship into an unsafe state. The context-aware system 
would detect such behavior and provide an alert in the form of a warning. If desired (and 
acceptable to the users) the system could take some level of active control, such as trying 
to return steering control to the location it was unilaterally taken from.  
Figure 10 and 11 provide a visual depiction of the two actions that the Helmsman 
and Lee Helmsman took and will provide a simpler way to conceptualize the system 
weaknesses. Followed by Figure 12, which is the same actions but with a theoretical 
context-aware layer introduced. 
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Figures 9 and 10 show the control actions required for thrust control transfer in both 
computer-assisted manual mode as well as backup manual mode. It is quite clear that thrust 
transfer in backup manual mode has significantly less safety-control measures in place. 
The most significant safety-control measure in place when operating in computer-assisted 
manual mode is that the transfer must be initiated by the station that currently has thrust 
control, and acknowledged by the station that is gaining. This process will be completed 
twice, once per shaft.  
This same task but with a context-aware layer could be instrumental in creating a 
safer execution of such operations in all available modes. Figure 11 has an added layer of 
context-awareness directly after the first control action. The context-aware layer here relies 
on an array of sensors to provide the human operator with information about the operating 
environment. The integration into the bridge and navigation system would utilize key 
sensor feeds from sources such as navigation, RADAR, and system status.  
The navigation data would provide the system with situational awareness of the 
navigational scheme the ship is operating in. The way a ship operates in the open ocean is 
different than when piloting. The RADAR data would provide the system a 360-degree 
contact picture. While traditionally the helm and/or lee helm positions do not play a role in 
contact management, a context aware bridge and navigation system would enable them to 
become part of that process. The more eyes the better when trying to manage a dense 
contact picture. This also directly ties into the BRM concept discussed previously. A 
system status data feed would provide key elements of the critical systems involved with 
surface vessels: which engines are online, where is steering located, where is thrust control 
located, are throttles ganged, overall health of these components, etc. 
Onboard JSM, the unintentional transfer of steering during the thrust transfer was 
a consequence of a poorly designed user interface among other things. This context aware 
layer would have questioned this transfer. A unilateral transfer of steering initiated by the 
lee helm position while all system indicators present no steering system casualty at the 
helm station would initiate some form of behavior-shaping mechanism. Additionally, a 
shift in location of steering in a dense contact environment such as the Singapore Strait is 
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not a common procedure when no steering casualty is present. This uncommon action 
would be another red flag used by the system to generate behavior-shaping mechanisms.  
During the thrust transfer from the helm station to the lee helm station the throttles 
became unganged. A context-aware layer may not have ensured the ganged function 
traveled during the transfer process, but the layer would have questioned the actions of the 
lee helm once speed changes were made. A split-shaft throttle maneuver is for the most 
part reserved for piloting waters and pier-side maneuvers. When operating in the open 
ocean environment, there is almost never a need to have one shaft set at a different speed 
than the other. When the Lee Helm reduced speed on JSM, only one shaft speed was 
reduced. The context-aware system would have questioned this action as it would be 
flagged as non-typical for the current operating environment. By immediately bringing this 
to the watchstanders attention he or she could re-gang the throttles and continue operations 
unaffected. 
One possible way the contextual information could be provided is through 
distributed real-time augmented reality. This could provide multiple views of the situation 
to the helmsman and others, that is, overlays of information on a virtual reality. A heads-
up display that can be configured to provide these watchstanders all relevant information 
to the performance of their duties would greatly enhance their visual understanding of the 
environment and the physical status of the systems they control. 
One of the potential unintended consequences is that the system may undo an action 
that it thinks is hazardous and could lead to an unsafe state when in fact the sailors on the 
bridge are actually making the intended action. In terms of cars, this would be like having 
a vehicle with an intelligent lane-keeping system, that is, a control system for automated 
steering (known as lateral control). Suppose a toy ball, followed by a child, rolls out in 
front of the car and the driver tries to swerve to miss the child and toy. The intelligent 
steering system tries to keep the car in the lane. These are conflicting decisions and control 
actions. The system can only reason with the data it receives from sensors and decision 
rules (algorithms) it has been programmed to process.  
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This concept would require no additional training beyond what is already required. 
Understanding the complexity of how the data flows and is processed is not vital to the 
watchstanders. The behavior shaping recommendations/mechanisms do not require any 
action by the watchstander, and can be ignored if the actions taken by the watchstanders 
are in fact correct. The overwhelming majority of sailors are smart, attentive, and overly 
qualified in the positions they man. Trusting such a system is no different than trusting 
your fellow watchstanders. In the example of the USS John S. McCain mishap, a context-
aware system would have most likely proved to increase the safety of that scenario. A 
thorough causal factor analysis would go much deeper than these surface-level discoveries, 
but there is no real way of getting around the fact that these two missteps by the 
watchstanders were significant hazard causal factors. Had they received local, 
instantaneous notification/recommendations based on their input orders, the outcome 
might have been different. 
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V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
The realm of artificial intelligence implemented into safety-critical systems is fairly 
new and has unlimited room to grow. The context-awareness capabilities discussed here 
are not meant to replace the human user, but to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the 
IBNS and other systems used on U.S. Navy ships. This study scratched the surface, leaving 
plenty of avenues for future work such as: 
1. Developing a prototype of a context-aware IBNS. 
2. Collaborating with Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity 
(NOSSA) to incorporate the approach used in this study into the Navy’s 
system safety engineering practices. 
3. Investigate how the introduction of context-awareness capabilities may 
themselves introduce safety hazards. 
The ever-increasing complexity of technology has introduced new challenges that 
safety professionals must confront. Long gone are the days in which classical safety 
engineering techniques alone are effective [3]. This study demonstrated that the STAMP 
method helps the safety engineer identify safety hazards and causal factors throughout a 
system’s control hierarchy. “What they lacked, and what we have been hindered in our 
progress by not having, is a more powerful accident causality model that matches today’s 
new technology and social drivers” [3]. The study also demonstrated how the application 
of STAMP can be used to identify where in a system safety hazards associated with human-
machine teaming can be addressed by improving through the introduction of context-aware 
capabilities. 
The demand signal for more advanced technology that can enable the warfighter to 
better perform their duties grows stronger every day. The Department of Defense and 
Department of the Navy have published high-level doctrine in the past two years 
demonstrating the seriousness of their commitment to the adoption of AI. There has been 
little work done on applying this doctrine to actual cases though. This study which suggests 
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the benefits that a context-aware system could provide was mindful of the ethical principles 
of artificial intelligence that the DOD has recently adopted. The principles cover five areas 
that are critical to producing effective and safe artificial intelligence [23]: 
1. Responsible. DOD personnel will exercise appropriate levels of 
judgment and care, while remaining responsible for the 
development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities. 
2. Equitable. The Department will take deliberate steps to minimize 
unintended bias in AI capabilities. 
3. Traceable. The Department’s AI capabilities will be developed and 
deployed such that relevant personnel possess an appropriate 
understanding of the technology, development processes, and 
operational methods applicable to AI capabilities, including with 
transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design 
procedure and documentation. 
4. Reliable. The Department’s AI capabilities will have explicit, well-
defined uses, and the safety, security, and effectiveness of such 
capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance within those 
defined uses across their entire life-cycles. 
5. Governable. The Department will design and engineer AI 
capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the 
ability to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and the ability 
to disengage or deactivate deployed systems that demonstrate 
unintended behavior. [23] 
The human-in-the-loop AI being suggested in this study must be reliable and 
governable above all else. How the system is designed, maintained, and analyzed will be 
critical to ensure it meets the standards of these principles. Nancy Leveson’s STAMP 
method can be the DOD’s solution. Developing a system from the ground up with STAMP 
is a commitment to safety, and with the complexity of future systems on the rise, safety 
should be at the forefront of every engineer’s mind, but at a minimum the safety engineer 
on an integrated project team needs to be the advocate for safety. “A life without adventure 
is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to take any form is sure 
to be short” [3]. 
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APPENDIX. REPORT ON THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS JOHN 
S MCCAIN (DDG-56) AND MOTOR VESSEL ALNIC MC  
The following is from [6]. 
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - USS JOHN S MCCAIN 
1.1 Introduction  
 USS JOHN S MCCAIN collided with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 
2017 in the Straits of Singapore.  
 JOHN S MCAIN is a Flight 1 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, commissioned in 
1994 and homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, as part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces 
and Carrier Strike Group FIVE. Approximately 300 sailors serve aboard MCCAIN. 
MCCAIN is 505 feet in length and carries a gross tonnage of approximately 9,000 tons.  
 ALNIC MC is a Liberia flagged oil and chemical tanker built in 2008. ALNIC 
MC is approximately 600 feet long and has a gross tonnage of approximately 30,000 
tons.  
 The collision between JOHN S MCCAIN and ALNIC resulted in the deaths of 10 
U.S. Sailors due to impact with MCCAIN’s berthing compartments, located below the 
waterline of the ship. ALNIC suffered no fatalities. U.S. Sailor fatalities were:  
 ETC Charles Nathan Findley of Amazonian, Missouri, 31 years old.  
 ICC Abraham Lopez of El Paso, Texas, 39 years old. 
 ET1 Kevin Sayer Bushell of Gaithersburg, Maryland, 26 years old.  
 ET1 Jacob Daniel Drake of Cable, Ohio, 21 years old.  
 ITl Timothy Thomas Eckels Jr. of Baltimore, Maryland, 23 years old.  
 ITl Corey George Ingram of Poughkeepsie, New York, 28 years old.  
 ET2 Dustin Louis Doyon of Suffield, Connecticut, 26 years old. 
 ET2 John Henry Hoagland III of Killeen, Texas, 20 years old.  
 IC2 Logan Stephen Palmer of Harristown, Illinois, 23 years old.  
 ET2 Kenneth Aaron Smith of Cherry Hill, New Jersey, 22 years old.  
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1.2 Summary of Findings  
The Navy determined the following causes of the collision:  
Loss of situational awareness in response to mistakes in the operation of the JOHN S 
MCCAIN’s steering and propulsion system, while in the presence of a high density of 
maritime traffic.  
Failure to follow the International Nautical Rules of the Road, a system of rules to govern 
the maneuvering of vessels when risk of collision is present.  
Watchstanders operating the JOHN S MCCAIN’s steering and propulsion systems had 
insufficient proficiency and knowledge of the systems.  
 
Figure 1 – Relative size of USS JOHN S MCCAIN Figure 2 – Illustration Map of Approximate Collision Location  
 




2. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS  
2.1 Background  
 JOHN S MCCAIN departed its homeport of Yokosuka, Japan on 26 May 2017 for 
a scheduled six month deployment in the Western Pacific, which at the time of the 
collision had included operations in the East and South China Seas, and port visits in 
Vietnam, Australia, Philippines and Japan. On the morning of 21 August, JOHN S 
MCCAIN was 50 nautical miles east of Singapore, approaching the Singapore Strait and 
Strait of Malacca, in transit to a scheduled port of call at Changi Naval Base, Singapore. 
These Straits form a combined ocean passage that is one of the busiest shipping lanes in 
the world, with more than 200 vessels passing through the straits each day. JOHN S 
MCCAIN was transiting through the southern end of the Strait. See Figure 2. In the 
predawn hours of 21 August 2017, the moon had set and the skies were overcast. There 
was no illumination and the sun would not rise until 0658. Seas were calm, with one to 
three foot swells. All navigation and propulsion equipment was operating properly.  
 At 0418, JOHN S MCCAIN transitioned to a Modified Navigation Detail due to 
approaching within 10 nautical miles from shoal water. This detail is used by the Navy 
when in proximity of water too shallow to safely navigate as occurs when entering ports. 
This detail supplemented the on watch team with a Navigation Evaluator and Shipping 
Officer, providing additional personnel and resources in the duties of Navigation and 
management of the ship’s relative position to other vessels.  
 JOHN S MCCAIN was scheduled to enter the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation 
Scheme less than an hour later. Traffic separation schemes are established by local 
authorities in approaches to ports throughout the world to provide ships assistance in 
separating their movements when transiting to and from ports. The Commanding Officer 
had been physically present on the bridge since 0115, a practice common for operations 
with higher risk, such as navigating in the presence of busy maritime traffic at night. The 
Executive Officer (XO) reported to the bridge at 0430 to provide additional supervision 
and oversight to enter port. Although JOHN S MCCAIN entered the Middle Channel of 
the Singapore Strait (a high traffic density area) at 0520, the Sea and Anchor Detail, a 
team the Navy uses for transiting narrower channels to enter port, was not scheduled to 
be stationed until 0600. This Detail provides additional personnel with specialized 
navigation and ship handling qualifications.  
 JOHN S MCCAIN was operating by procedures established for U.S. Navy 
surface ships when operating at sea before sunrise, including being at “darkened ship.” 
“Darkened Ship” means that all exterior lighting was off except for the navigation lights 
that provide identification to other vessels, and all interior lighting was switched to red 
instead of white to facilitate crew rest. The ship was in a physical posture known as 
“Modified ZEBRA,” meaning that all doors inside the ship, and all hatches, which are 
openings located on the floor between decks, at the main deck and below were shut to 
help secure the boundaries between different areas of the ship in case of flooding or fire. 
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Watertight scuttles on the hatches (smaller circular openings that can be opened or closed 
independently of the hatch) were left open in order to allow easy transit between spaces.  
2.2 Events Leading to the Collision  
 At 0519, the Commanding Officer noticed the Helmsman (the watchstander 
steering the ship) having difficulty maintaining course while also adjusting the throttles 
for speed control. In response, he ordered the watch team to divide the duties of steering 
and throttles, maintaining course control with the Helmsman while shifting speed control 
to another watchstander known as the Lee Helm station, who sat directly next to the 
Helmsman at the panel to control these two functions, known as the Ship’s Control 
Console. See Figures 3 and 4. This unplanned shift caused confusion in the watch team, 
and inadvertently led to steering control transferring to the Lee Helm Station without the 
knowledge of the watch team. The CO had only ordered speed control shifted. Because 
he did not know that steering had been transferred to the Lee Helm, the Helmsman 
perceived a loss of steering.  
Figure 4 – Bridge Schematic of JOHN S MCCAIN 
 
 
Figure 5 - Illustration of Ship Control Console on JOHN S MCCAIN 
 Steering was never physically lost. Rather, it had been shifted to a different 
control station and watchstanders failed to recognize this configuration. Complicating 
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this, the steering control transfer to the Lee Helm caused the rudder to go amidships 
(centerline). Since the Helmsman had been steering 1–4 degrees of right rudder to 
maintain course before the transfer, the amidships rudder deviated the ship’s course to the 
left.  
 Additionally, when the Helmsman reported loss of steering, the Commanding 
Officer slowed the ship to 10 knots and eventually to 5 knots, but the Lee Helmsman 
reduced only the speed of the port shaft as the throttles were not coupled together 
(ganged). The starboard shaft continued at 20 knots for another 68 seconds before the Lee 
Helmsman reduced its speed. The combination of the wrong rudder direction, and the two 
shafts working opposite to one another in this fashion caused an un-commanded turn to 
the left (port) into the heavily congested traffic area in close proximity to three ships, 
including the ALNIC. See Figure 5.  
 
Figure 6 – Illustration Map of Approximate Collision Location 
 Although JOHN S MCCAIN was now on a course to collide with ALNIC, the 
Commanding Officer and others on the ship’s bridge lost situational awareness. No one 
on the bridge clearly understood the forces acting on the ship, nor did they understand the 
ALNIC’s course and speed relative to JOHN S MCCAIN during the confusion.  
 Approximately three minutes after the reported loss of steering, JOHN S 
MCCAIN regained positive steering control at another control station, known as Aft 
Steering, and the Lee Helm gained control of both throttles for speed and corrected the 
mismatch between the port and starboard shafts. These actions were too late, and at 
approximately 0524 JOHN S MCCAIN crossed in front of ALNIC’s bow and collided. 
See Figure 6.  
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Figure 7 – Approximate Geometry and Point of Impact between USS JOHN S MCCAIN and ALNIC MC 
 Despite their close proximity, neither JOHN S MCCAIN nor ALNIC sounded the 
five short blasts of whistle required by the International Rules of the Nautical Road for 
warning one another of danger, and neither attempted to make contact through Bridge to 
Bridge communications.  
3. IMPACT OF THE COLLISION 
 The bulbous bow of ALNIC MC impacted JOHN S MCCAIN on the port (left) 
aft side. The impact created a 28-foot diameter hole both below and above the waterline 
of the JOHN S MCCAIN. See Figures 7, 8, and 9.  
 
Figure 8 – Bulbous bow of Figure 9 – Point of impact on JOHN S MCCAIN ALINIC 
MC and damage to from ALINIC MC 
hull from bow to stern  
 
 The point of impact was centered on Berthings 3 and 5 as noted in Figure 9. All 
significant injuries occurred to Sailors that were in Berthing 3 at the time of the impact. 
All ten of the fallen Sailors were in Berthing 5 at the time of impact.  
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Figure 10 - Depiction of Approximate Location of Point of Impact 
 ALNIC MC and JOHN S MCCAIN initially remained attached to each other after 
the collision. Sailors describe this as lasting up to a couple of minutes. The prolonged 
contact kept the ship from taking a list (tilt to one side) immediately. Sailors on the 
bridge and on the external deck of the ship immediately after the collision could see 
ALNIC MC’s bow (front of the ship) still lodged into the side of JOHN S MCCAIN. 
However, within 15 minutes JOHN S MCCAIN had developed a four degree list to port 
as the ship flooded.  
 The collision was felt throughout the ship. Watchstanders on the bridge were 
jolted from their stations momentarily and watchstanders in aft steering were thrown off 
their feet. Several suffered minor injuries. Some Sailors thought the ship had run 
aground, while others were concerned that they had been attacked. Sailors in parts of the 
ship away from the impact point compared it to an earthquake. Those nearest the impact 
point described it as like an explosion.  
 As required by Navy procedures, the Executive Officer ordered the collision 
alarm sounded to alert personnel to begin damage control efforts. The Commanding 
Officer remained on the bridge and the Executive Officer departed to the Combat 
Information Center and eventually to Berthing 3 to provide oversight in damage control 
efforts. The Command Master Chief, the senior assigned enlisted Sailor onboard, went to 
the area where damage control efforts, known as the Central Control Station, were 
managed and then moved about the ship, assisting damage control efforts. After the 
situation on the bridge stabilized, the Commanding Officer then proceeded to Central 
Control Station to check on the status of the damage control efforts.  
 The CO ordered the watch team to announce the collision on the Bridge-to-Bridge 
radio, which alerted other ships in the area to the collision and the damages. At 0530, 
JOHN S MCCAIN requested tugboats and pilots from Singapore Harbor to assist in 
getting the ship to Changi Naval Base.  
 JOHN S MCCAIN changed its lighting configuration at the mast to one red light 
over another red light, known as “red over red,” the international lighting scheme that 
indicates a ship that is “not under command.” Under the International Rules of the 
50 
Nautical Road, this warns other ships that, due to an exceptional circumstance, a vessel is 
unable to maneuver as required.  
 Most of the electronic systems on the bridge were inoperable until the two ships 
parted. Main communications systems on the bridge stopped working after the collision 
and the bridge began using handheld radios to communicate with aft steering. Sound 
powered phones, which do not require electrical power to transmit communications, and 
handheld radios were the main means of communication from the bridge. Aft Internal 
Communications, a space adjacent to Berthing 5 with communications control equipment, 
quickly flooded and was likely responsible for the loss of bridge communications.  
 All U.S. Navy ships are designed to withstand and recover from damage due to 
fire, flooding, and other damage sustained during combat or other emergencies. Each ship 
has a Damage Control Assistant, working under the Engineering Officer, in order to 
establish and maintain an effective damage control organization. The Damage Control 
Assistant oversees the prevention and control of damage including control of stability, 
list, and trim due to flooding (maintaining the proper level of the ship from side to side 
and front and back), coordinates firefighting efforts, and is also responsible for the 
operation, care and maintenance of the ship’s repair facilities. The Damage Control 
Assistant ensures the ship’s repair party personnel are properly trained in damage control 
procedures including firefighting, flooding and emergency repairs. The Damage Control 
Assistant is assisted by the Damage Control Chief (DCC), a chief petty officer 
specializing in Damage Control. The officer in charge of damage control efforts, the 
Damage Control Assistant, called away General Quarters to notify the crew to commence 
damage control efforts.  
 General Quarters is a process whereby the crew reports to pre-assigned stations 
and duties in the event of large casualties such as flooding. General Quarters is 
announced by an alarm that sounds throughout the ship to alert the crew of an emergency 
situation or potential combat operations. All crewmembers are trained to report to their 
General Quarters watch station and to set a higher condition of material readiness against 
fire, flooding, or other damage. This involves securing additional doors, hatches, scuttles, 
valves and equipment to isolate damage and prepare for combat. Navy crews train on 
Damage Control continuously, with drills being run in port and underway frequently to 
prepare the teams for damage to equipment and spaces. During any emergency condition 
(fire, flooding, combat operations), the Damage Control Assistant coordinates and 
supervises all damage control efforts from one of the three Damage Control Repair 
Lockers.  
 Damage Control Repair Lockers are specialized spaces stationed throughout the 
ship filled with repair equipment and manned during emergencies with teams of about 20 
personnel trained to respond to casualties. There are three repair lockers on the JOHN S. 
 MCCAIN: Repair Locker 2, Repair Locker 5, and Repair Locker 3. Repair Locker 
2 covers the forward part of the ship, Repair Locker 5 covers the engineering spaces and 
Repair Locker 3 covers the aft part of the ship. Each locker is maintained with similar 
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equipment. Personnel assigned to repair lockers are trained and qualified to respond to 
and repair damage from a variety of sources with a specific focus on fire and flooding. 
Each repair locker can act independently but is also designed to support the others and 
can take over the responsibilities for any locker if damage prevents that locker’s use. The 
repair lockers are normally unmanned unless the ship sets a condition of higher readiness 
like General Quarters when they would be manned within minutes.  
 Sailors began to locate, report and track flooding, fire, and structural damage to the 
ship immediately. Significant damage was reported throughout the ship in the moments 
after the collision, including flooding, internal fuel leakage, loss of ventilation and internal 
communications, and degradation of many of the ship’s other systems.  
 JOHN S MCCAIN began the process of accounting for all crew members 
immediately after the collision. This process continued even as the crew made emergency 
repairs, battled flooding, and helped each other out of damaged spaces. The damage 
control efforts made confirming the location of personnel difficult. Varying reports of 
missing Sailors were made in the first minutes after the collision. However, by the 
submission of the third complete report, there was reasonable confidence that the crew 
had been accounted for was correct because all of the ten missing Sailors had been 
consistently reported missing and all lived in Berthing 5, a space that was inaccessible 
and flooded.  
3.1 Impact to Berthing 5  
 Berthing 5 is located aft (near the back of the ship) on the port side. See Figure 
10. It is approximately 25 feet by 15 feet and has 18 racks, stacked as bunk beds three-
high. Each row of racks has a locker for Sailors’ belongings. There is a lounge with seats, 
a small table, and a wall- mounted television. There is a head with one toilet, one shower 
stall, and one sink.  
 




 There are two means to exit Berthing 5: the primary egress (ladderwell) through a 
hatch with a scuttle (Figure 11) and an escape scuttle into Berthing 3 on the deck above 
(Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12 – Primary egress from Berthing 5 Figure 13 – Escape Scuttle from Berthing 5  
 During Modified ZEBRA, the hatch is closed, but the scuttle is open for ease of 
access. The escape scuttle is normally closed at all times, as it was at the time of the 
impact. The collision knocked debris in Berthing 3 on top of the escape scuttle 
connecting Berthing 3 to Berthing 5 below it. This would have made any attempts to 
open and exit through the escape scuttle very difficult.  
 Most of the Berthing 5, a space that is normally 15 feet wide, was compressed by 
the impact to only 5 feet wide. There were 17 Sailors assigned to Berthing 5. At the time 
of the collision, all were aboard the ship and five were on watch or outside the space. 
Based on the size of the hole, and the fact that Berthing 5 is below the waterline, the 
space likely fully flooded in less than a minute after the collision.  
 Two Sailors who were in Berthing 5 at the time of the collision escaped from the 
space. The first Sailor was on the second step of the ladder-well leading to the deck 
above when the collision occurred. The impact of the collision knocked him to the 
ground, leaving his back and legs bruised. Fuel quickly pooled around him and he 
scrambled up and back onto the ladder. The Sailor climbed out of Berthing 5 through the 
open scuttle, covered in fuel and water from the near instantaneous flooding of the space. 
He did not see anyone ahead of or behind him as he escaped. He reported seeing two 
other Sailors in the lounge area, one preparing for watch duties and another standing near 
his rack. Both of these Sailors were lost, along with the eight shipmates who were in their 
racks to rest at the time of the collision.  
 The second Sailor who escaped from Berthing 5 heard the crashing and pushing 
of metal before the sound of water rushing in. Within seconds, water was at chest level. 
The passageway leading to the ladder-well was blocked by debris, wires and other 
wreckage hanging from the overhead. From the light of the battle lanterns (the emergency 
lighting that turns on when there is a loss of normal lights due to power outage) he could 
see that he would have to climb over the debris to get to the ladder-well.  
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 As he started his climb across the debris to the open scuttle, the water was already 
within a foot of the overhead, so he took a breath, dove into the water, and swam towards 
the ladder-well. Underwater, he bumped into debris and had to feel his way along. He 
was able to stop twice for air as he swam, the water higher each time, and eventually used 
the pipes to guide him towards the light coming from the scuttle. The Sailor found that 
the blindfolded egress training, a standard that requires training to prepare Sailors for an 
emergency and was conducted when he reported to the command, was essential to his 
ability to escape.  
 One Sailor was alerted by the first Sailor who escaped Berthing 5 that others were 
still inside the space, and he went to assist them. When he first reached the closed hatch 
and open scuttle, the water in Berthing 5 was at the top of the third rung. He tried to enter 
the space, but was forced back up the ladder by the pressure of the escaping air and rising 
water, which within seconds had risen to within a foot of the hatch. He saw a Sailor 
swimming toward the exit and pulled him out of the water through the scuttle between 
the two decks. This was the second and last Sailor to escape from Berthing 5. His body 
was scraped, bruised, and covered with chemical burns from being submerged in the 
mixture of water and fuel.  
 An additional Sailor who came to assist observed the rescue and, looking down 
into the berthing, saw “a green swirl of rising seawater and foaming fuel” approaching 
the top of the scuttle. As the final Sailor to leave Berthing 5 was pulled to safety, the 
Sailors at the top of the scuttle checked to see if there was anyone behind him. They did 
not see anybody. By then, so much water was already coming up through the scuttle that 
it was difficult to close and secure. The fuel mixed in with the water made one of Sailor’s 
hands so slippery that he cut himself while using the wrench designed to secure the 
scuttle, but the two were able to secure it to stop the rapid flooding of the ship.  
3.2 Impact on Berthing 3  
 Berthing 3 is immediately above Berthing 5, but spans the width of the ship. 
There are two points of egress from each side of Berthing 3; on the port side there is a 
ladder-well leading down into the center of the berthing and an escape scuttle that is 
located in the forward section of the space leading up to the next deck. There were 71 
Sailors assigned to Berthing 3.  
 At 0530, the DCA began receiving reports of a ruptured fire main and water and 
fuel flooding into Berthing 3. The port side of Berthing 3 suffered substantial damage, 
including a large hole in the bulkhead. See Figure 13. Racks and lockers detached from 
the walls and were thrown about, leaving jagged metal throughout the space. Cables and 
debris hung from the ceiling.  
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Figure 14 - Relative Positions of Berthings 3, 5, and 7 and point of impact 
 A Sailor from Berthing 3, who was later medically evacuated from the ship, 
sustained his injuries as the wall next to him blew apart in the collision and threw him to 
the ground. Water and fuel quickly pooled around him in the short time he was on the 
ground, and he began crawling over debris to escape. Another Sailor went to him and 
helped pull him to the lounge area and toward the ladder. On the way, the Sailor who was 
being assisted fell on the slippery floor and hit his head. Two other Sailors, also injured, 
helped him reach the flight deck.  
 Limited lighting guided the remaining Sailors as they left the berthing space. 
Sailors had to climb over lockers and other debris to escape, using the high vantage point 
to also minimize the risk of electrocution from traveling through the rising water. Some 
escaped in only their underwear, and many were bruised and bloodied from injuries 
sustained in the collision and covered in fuel. At least one Sailor attempted to move the 
metal rack pinning a trapped shipmate, and realized that he could not move it alone. The 
Sailors who escaped Berthing 3 provided some of the first reports to CCS that the space 
was severely damaged, that it was rapidly taking on water, and that Sailors were trapped 
inside.  
 Hearing reports that Sailors were trapped in Berthing 3, the Executive Offer and a 
group of Sailors, including some who evacuated Berthing 7, went to check on their 
shipmates. Several Sailors were pinned in their racks as a result of the collision, but, as 
the two ships pulled apart, the twisted metal shifted and most of the Sailors in Berthing 3 
were able to escape as the debris moved. One of these Sailors was pinned in his rack 
underneath two racks that had collapsed and a number of lockers that became dislodged 
during the collision. He was able to escape after ALNIC MC detached. See Figures 14 
and 15.  
55 
  
Figure 15 – Berthing 3 facing port Figure 16 – Berthing 3 facing port after collision 
 However, two Sailors remained pinned in their racks even after the ships 
separated. Four members of the crew entered Berthing 3 through the jagged metal and 
rising water to rescue them. The first of these rescuers heard Sailors shouting for help 
from inside Berthing 3 and tried to enter on the port side; however, the door was blocked 
by debris, so he ran to the entrance on the starboard (right) side of the berthing.  
 One of the Sailors trapped in Berthing 3 had been asleep at the time of the 
collision and was awoken by it. When he opened his eyes, he understood that he was 
pinned in his rack, with one of his shoulders stuck between his rack and the rack above. 
He felt both air and water moving around him. He could hear shouting and began 
shouting himself, which alerted his others that he was trapped. Only his hand and foot 
were visible by those outside of the rack. The one battle lantern in the area provided the 
only light for rescuers to find the trapped Sailor. Water was already at knee level when 
rescuers reached him. The debris was too heavy for the rescuers to move, and a Portable 
Electric All-Purpose Rescue System, a “jaw of life” cutting device, was required to cut 
through the metal, separate the panels of the rack, and pull the panels out of the way. 
After approximately 30 minutes, these efforts allowed the trapped Sailor to pull his arm 
free. Moments later, the rescuers pulled him from between the racks by his foot. Stretcher 
bearers came to Berthing 3 and carried this Sailor to the Mess Decks to receive medical 
treatment.  
 The second Sailor was in a bottom rack in Berthing 3. His rack was lifted off the 
floor as a result of the collision, which likely prevented him from drowning in the rising 
water, and he was trapped at an angle between racks that had been pressed together. Light 
was visible through a hole in his rack and he could hear the water and smell the fuel 
beginning to fill Berthing 3. 
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 He attempted to push his way out of the rack, but every time he moved the space 
between the racks grew smaller and he was unable to escape. His foot was outside the 
rack and he could feel water. It was hot in the space and difficult to breathe, but he 
managed to shout for help and banged against the metal rack to get the attention of other 
Sailors in the berthing space. The Sailors who entered Berthing 3 to rescue others heard 
this and began assisting him, but he was pinned by more debris than the first Sailor freed.  
 It took approximately an hour from the time of the collision to free the second 
Sailor from his rack. Rescuers used an axe to cut through the debris, a crow bar to pull 
the lockers apart piece by piece, and rigged a pulley to move a heavy locker in order to 
reach the Sailor. Throughout the long process, his rescuers assured him by touching his 
foot, which was still visible. Once freed, the Sailor was the last person to escape Berthing 
3. Everything aft of his rack was a mass of twisted metal. He had scrapes and bruises all 
over his body, suffered a broken arm, and had hit his head. He was unsure whether he 
remained conscious throughout the rescue.  
 At least one scuttle to Berthing 3 was shut during damage control efforts. The 
space was electrically isolated and, at 0608, the fire main valves were closed, reducing 
the amount of flooding. Dewatering efforts began and succeeded in removing the water 
from Berthing 3 prior to JOHN S MCCAIN’s arrival at Changi Naval Base.  
3.3 Impact on Berthings 4, 6, and 7  
 Berthings 5 and 7 are next to each other on the port side of the ship, mirrored by 
Berthings 4 and 6, respectively, on the starboard side of the ship. Berthings 4 and 5 are 
connected across the ship through “cross flooding ducts,” designed to distribute water 
from port to starboard side (or vice versa) to keep the ship level if it takes on water. 
Berthings 6 and 7 are similarly connected. A six foot long crack in the wall between 
Berthings 5 and 7, created by the collision, allowed water to move between the spaces.  
 All Sailors in Berthing 7 were able to evacuate, but water was at approximately 
knee level as they exited the space. At 0530 there was report of a ruptured pipe in 
Berthing 7, which added to the flooding caused by the cracked wall separating Berthings 
5 and 7. By 0605, Berthing 7 was reported as lost, meaning that it was fully flooded and 
secured to prevent the flooding from spreading to the rest of the ship.  
 All Sailors in Berthing 4 were able to evacuate. At 0544, Sailors reported 4 inches 
of water on the deck in Berthing 4. Sailors in Berthing 4 were thrown about their racks by 






Figure 17—Scuttle and hatch into Figure 18—Berthing 4 racks after Berthing 4 showing the 
space dewatering completely flooded  
 All Sailors in Berthing 6 were able to evacuate. At 0546 flooding was reported in 
Berthing 6, which is across from Berthing 7 on the starboard side of the ship. Despite the 
crew’s dewatering efforts, the space was declared lost at 0627.  
 At approximately 0630, as a result of crew’s resiliency and successful damage 
control and engineering repair efforts, JOHN S MCCAIN was able to proceed under its 
own power toward Changi Naval Base, Singapore, at an average speed of 3 knots. JOHN 
S MCCAIN’s navigation equipment was degraded as a result of the collision. While most 
electronic navigational aids on the bridge were operational, multiple warnings and alerts 
were illuminated, reducing the navigation team’s confidence that the information was 
reliable. Because of the degraded information, the team relied on “seaman’s eye” to stay 
on track while returning to port. Lack of ventilation across the ship raised concerns based 
on the amount of fuel that had spilled and the risks posed by rising temperatures inside 
the ship. The temperatures also drove many Sailors to the flight deck in order to escape 
the heat.  
4. MEDICAL EFFORTS AND INJURIES 
 JOHN S MCCAIN medical teams established a triage center in Messing. This 
space, where the crew eats their meals, provided the largest open space on the ship and 
medical procedures can be performed on the cafeteria-style tables. The medical team 
treated lacerations and chemical burns from fuel exposure, splinted broken bones, and 
provided broad spectrum antibiotics to Sailors with open wounds. Triage care moved 
back to the Medical office at approximately 0630, as the initial rush of patients had been 
treated so the medical team would have full access to their equipment and supplies.  
 At approximately 0915, as the ship was transiting to Changi Naval Base, four 
seriously injured Sailors were medically evacuated to Singapore General Hospital by 
helicopter. Once pier-side at Changi Naval Base, another Sailor was transported to the 
hospital because of shock symptoms and an injury to his shoulder. This Sailor was one of 
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the Sailors who had been trapped in Berthing 3. Three of the five medically evacuated 
Sailors were transported from Singapore to Yokosuka, Japan on 27 August 2017. The 
remaining two were transported back to Yokosuka, Japan on 28 August 2017.  
 As JOHN S MCCAIN approached Changi Naval Base, AMERICA approached 
alongside and two members of AMERICA’s medical team came aboard to provide 
additional support, including intravenous fluids to treat heat stroke. Once the ships were 
pier side, AMERICA hosted the JOHN S MCCAIN medical team, together treating 
Sailors with cuts and chemical burns from fuel exposure. Until alternative arrangements 
could be made, AMERICA also provided meals for all JOHN S MCCAIN Sailors and 
berthing for over 150 Sailors whose berthings were flooded. The Sailors and Marines 
aboard AMERICA also provided initial support for the JOHN S MCCAIN crew, 
including daily supplies, watchstanders, counseling, and communications network 
support.  
 In total, 48 Sailors suffered injuries that required medical treatment. Five Sailors 
who were treated at Singapore General Hospital suffered severe injuries and were unable 
to return to their duties for more than 24 hours. Of the 48 injured Sailors, 43 continued to 
assist with damage control and recovery efforts immediately following the collision.  
5. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS - 21 TO 24 AUGUST 2017 
 Though the ship did not have a complete muster confirming ten Sailors were 
missing until 0715, JOHN S MCCAIN reported that Sailors were believed missing within 
moments of the collision. Coordination began immediately for search and rescue (SAR) 
efforts in the water space surrounding the collision site.  
 At approximately 0715 on 21 August 2017, SAR Operations commenced with 
Commander, Amphibious Squadron 3 (CPR 3) as SAR On-Scene Commander. At 
approximately 0700, AMERICA was enroute and preparing to launch MV-22B Ospreys 
and MH- 60S Sea Hawks to support SAR efforts once in range. Republic of Singapore 
Navy (RSN) and Republic of Singapore Coast Guard (RSNCG) SAR units were on 
station by 0800. Eventually there would be six Singaporean and six Malaysian vessels 
searching near the collision site.  
 At approximately 0900, the Republic of Singapore (RSN) deployed three ships 
with damage control equipment to assist and transfer equipment to JOHN S MCCAIN on 
a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB).  
 At approximately 1000 and 1030, two helicopters from AMERICA landed on the 
deck of JOHN S MCCAIN with damage control equipment and in support of the SAR 
efforts. By approximately 1400, U.S. Navy aircraft were conducting SAR efforts within 
25nm of the collision point. A RSN helicopter, two RSN patrol boats, and a RSNCG 
vessel were on scene to assist.  
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 The Malaysian Navy and RSN both searched 10nm on either side of the path that 
JOHN S MCCAIN had traveled, attempting to locate any Sailors that may have fallen 
through the hole in the ship’s hull made by the collision. Throughout the evening of 21 
August 2017, and continuously until 2000 on 24 August 2017, aircraft and surface vessels 
from the U.S. Navy, RSN, RSNCG, Singapore Air Force, Singapore Maritime Port 
Authority, Royal Malaysian Navy, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Indonesian 
Navy and Royal Australian Air Force conducted multinational SAR operations. These 
efforts were coordinated from AMERICA, lasting for more than 80 hours and spanning 
more than 2,100-square miles.  
 On 22 August 2017, a body was found in the water by Malaysian units assisting 
the SAR efforts. The body was determined not to be one of the Sailors missing from 
JOHN S MCCAIN. SEVENTH Fleet suspended all SAR efforts outside the hull of JOHN 
S MCCAIN at sunset on 24 August 2017. Recovery efforts inside the hull of the ship 
continued.  
6. DIVING AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
 A team of Navy Divers arrived on JOHN S MCCAIN as the ship entered the 
harbor in Singapore at approximately 1200 on 21 August 2017. They began inspecting 
the ship to determine how best to proceed with a dive inside the ship. The leader of the 
dive team inspected Berthing 3 and saw waves breaking into the ship. The divers 
discovered the hole in the port side of JOHN S MCCAIN that was approximately 28 feet 
wide. See Figure 18.  
 
Figure 19 – Port side of JOHN S MCCAIN post-collision 
 By approximately 1435, JOHN S MCCAIN was moored and divers were in the 
water looking for places to enter the hull of the ship. The hole in the port side penetrated 
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not only the hull, but an internal fuel tank as well. The fuel in the water created a number 
of hazards to divers and required them to proceed cautiously.  
 On a second dive at approximately 1500, divers were able to enter the hull of the 
ship to do initial safety assessments. Many of the conditions they found led to a cautious 
approach to assure the safety of the divers. The large amount of debris and structural 
damage required the divers to move slowly about the ship, even cutting holes through racks 
to access parts of the space. Visibility in Berthing 5 was very poor given the debris and 
lack of light. The divers had to move about the space almost exclusively by feel. The dive 
team conducted nearly continuous dive operations over a period of seven days until all ten 
of the Sailors in Berthing 5 were recovered.  
7. FINDINGS 
 Collisions at sea are rare and the relative performance and fault of the vessels 
involved is an open admiralty law issue. The Navy is not concerned about the mistakes 
made by ALNIC. Instead, the Navy is focused on the performance of its ships and what 
we could have done differently to avoid these mishaps.  
 In the Navy, the responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his or her ship is 
absolute. Many of the decisions made that led to this incident were the result of poor 
judgment and decision making of the Commanding Officer. That said, no single person 
bears full responsibility for this incident. The crew was unprepared for the situation in 
which they found themselves through a lack of preparation, ineffective command and 
control and deficiencies in training and preparations for navigation.  
7.1 Training  
 From the time when the CO ordered the Helm and Lee Helm split, to moments 
just before the collision, four different Sailors were involved in manipulating the controls 
at the SCC.  
 Because steering control was in backup manual at the helm station, the offer of 
control existed at all the other control stations (Lee Helm, Helm forward station, Bridge 
Command and Control station and Aft Steering Unit). System design is such that any of 
these stations could have taken control of steering via drop down menu selection and the 
Lee Helm’s acceptance of the request. If this had occurred, steering control would have 
been transferred.  
 When taking control of steering, the Aft Steering Helmsman failed to first verify 
the rudder position on the After Steering Control Console prior to taking control. This 
error led to an exacerbated turn to port just prior to the collision, as the indicated rudder 
position was 33 degrees left, vice amidships. As a result, the rudder had a left 33 degrees 
order at the console at this time, exacerbating the turn to port.  
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 Several Sailors on watch during the collision with control over steering were 
temporarily assigned from USS ANTIETAM (CG 54) with significant differences 
between the steering control systems of both ships and inadequate training to compensate 
for these differences.  
 Multiple bridge watchstanders lacked a basic level of knowledge on the steering 
control system, in particular the transfer of steering and thrust control between stations. 
Contributing, personnel assigned to ensure these watchstanders were trained had an 
insufficient level of knowledge to effectively maintain appropriate rigor in the 
qualification program. The senior most officer responsible for these training standards 
lacked a general understanding of the procedure for transferring steering control between 
consoles.  
7.2 Seamanship and Navigation  
 Much of the track leading up to the Singapore Traffic Separation Scheme was 
significantly congested and dictated a higher state of readiness. Had this occurred, 
maximum plant reliability could have been set with a Master Helmsman and a qualified 
Engineering Lee Helm on watch.  
 If the CO had set Sea and Anchor Detail adequately in advance of entering the 
Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme, then it is unlikely that a collision would have 
occurred. The plan for setting the Sea and Anchor Detail was a failure in risk 
management, as it required watch turnover of all key watch stations within a significantly 
congested TSS and only 30 minutes prior to the Pilot pickup.  
 If JOHN S MCCAIN had sounded at five short blasts or made Bridge-to-Bridge 
VHF hails or notifications in a timely manner, then it is possible that a collision might not 
have occurred.  
 If ALNIC had sounded at least five short blasts or made Bridge-to-Bridge VHF 
hails or notifications, then it is possible that a collision might not have occurred.  
7.3 Leadership and Culture  
 The Commanding Officer decided not to station the Sea and Anchor detail when 
appropriate, despite recommendations from the Navigator, Operations Officer and 
Executive Officer.  
 Principal watchstanders including the Officer of the Deck, in charge of the safety 
of the ship, and the Conning Officer on watch at the time of the collision did not attend 
the Navigation Brief the afternoon prior. This brief is designed to provide maximum 
awareness of the risks involved in the evolution.  
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 Leadership failed to provide the appropriate amount of supervision in constructing 
watch assignments for the evolution by failing to assign sufficient experienced officers to 
duties.  
 The Commanding Officer ordered an unplanned shift of thrust control from the 
Helm Station to the Lee Helm station, an abnormal operating condition, without clear 
notification.  
 No bridge watchstander in any supervisory position ordered steering control 
shifted from the Helm to the Lee Helm station as would have been appropriate to 
accomplish the Commanding Officer’s order. As a result, no supervisors were aware that 
the transfer had occurred.  
 Senior officers failed to provide input and back up to the Commanding Officer 
when he ordered ship control transferred between two different stations in proximity to 
heavy maritime traffic.  
 Senior officers and bridge watchstanders did not question the Helm’s report of a 
loss of steering nor pursue the issue for resolution.  
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